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Abstract
Multiplication and comultiplication of beliefs represent a generalisation of multiplication
and comultiplication of probabilities as well as of binary logic AND and OR. Our approach
follows that of subjective logic, where belief functions are expressed as opinions that are
interpreted as being equivalent to b probability distributions. We compare diﬀerent types of
opinion product and coproduct, and show that they represent very good approximations of
the analytical product and coproduct of b probability distributions. We also deﬁne division
and codivision of opinions, and compare our framework with other logic frameworks for
combining uncertain propositions.
 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Subjective logic [2] is a belief calculus based on the Dempster–Shafer belief theory
[5]. In subjective logic the term opinion denotes beliefs about propositions, and a set
of standard and non-standard logic operators can be used to combine opinions
about propositions in various ways. A particular type of multiplication and co-
multiplication called propositional conjunction and propositional disjunction in [2] will
be called simple multiplication and simple comultiplication here. In [2] it was also
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described how every opinion can be uniquely mapped to a b probability distribution,
thereby providing a speciﬁc interpretation of belief functions in Bayesian probabi-
listic terms. A vacuous opinion about a binary proposition is for example equivalent
to a uniform probability distribution. A question left open in [2] was why simple
multiplication of two vacuous opinions produces a product opinion that when
mapped to a b distribution is slightly diﬀerent from the analytical product of two
uniform distributions. Below we will explain the reason for this diﬀerence, and also
deﬁne alternatives to simple multiplication and simple comultiplication in the form
of normal multiplication and normal comultiplication of opinions. Simple and normal
multiplication and comultiplication are compared to analytical multiplication and
comultiplication of b distributions in the general case. We also deﬁne the inverse
opinion operators normal division and normal codivision.
2. Fundamentals of subjective logic
Subjective logic is suitable for approximate reasoning in situations where there is
more or less uncertainty about whether a given proposition is true or false, and this
uncertainty can be expressed by a belief mass assignment 1 (BMA) where a quantity
of belief mass on a given proposition can be interpreted as contributing to the
probability that the proposition is true. More speciﬁcally, if a set denoted by H of
exhaustive mutually exclusive singletons can be deﬁned, this set is referred to as a
frame of discernment. Each singleton, which will be called an atomic element here-
after, can be interpreted as a proposition that can be either true or false. The
powerset of H denoted by 2H contains all possible subsets of H. The set 2H  f;g of
nonempty subsets of H will be called its reduced powerset. A BMA assigns belief
mass to nonempty subsets of H (i.e. to elements of 2H  f;g) without specifying any
detail of how to distribute the belief mass amongst the elements of a particular
subset. In this case, then for any non-atomic subset of H, a belief mass on that subset
expresses uncertainty regarding the probability distribution over the elements of the
subset. More generally, a belief mass assignment m on H is deﬁned as a function
from 2H  f;g to ½0; 1 satisfying:
X
xH
mðxÞ ¼ 1: ð1Þ
Each nonempty subset x  H such that mðxÞ > 0 is called a focal element of m.
Special names are used to describe speciﬁc BMA classes. When mðHÞ ¼ 1 the BMA
is vacuous. When all the focal elements are atomic elements, the BMA is Bayesian.
When mðHÞ ¼ 0 the BMA is dogmatic [7]. Let us note, that trivially, every Bayesian
belief function is dogmatic. When all the focal elements are nestable (i.e. linearly
ordered by inclusion), then the BMA is consonant.
1 Called basic probability assignment in [5].
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Given a particular frame of discernment and a BMA, the Dempster–Shafer theory
[5] deﬁnes a belief function 2 bðxÞ. In addition, subjective logic [2] deﬁnes a disbelief
function dðxÞ, an uncertainty function uðxÞ, a relative atomicity function aðx=yÞ and a
probability expectation EðxÞ. These are all deﬁned as follows:
bðxÞ,
X
;6¼yx
mðyÞ 8x 2 2H; ð2Þ
dðxÞ,
X
y\x¼;
mðyÞ 8x 2 2H; ð3Þ
uðxÞ,
X
y\x 6¼;
y 6x
mðyÞ 8x 2 2H; ð4Þ
aðx=yÞ, jx \ yjjyj 8x 2 2
H; y 2 2H  f;g; ð5Þ
EðxÞ,
X
yH
mðyÞaðx=yÞ 8x 2 2H: ð6Þ
The relative atomicity function of a subset x relative to the frame of discernment H is
simply denoted by aðxÞ. It can be shown that the belief, disbelief and uncertainty
functions deﬁned above satisfy:
bðxÞ þ dðxÞ þ uðxÞ ¼ 1; x 2 2H  f;g: ð7Þ
The belief, disbelief and uncertainty functions are dependent through Eq. (7) so that
one is redundant. As such they represent nothing more than the traditional BelðxÞ
(Belief) and PlðxÞ (Plausibility) pair of Shaferian belief theory, where BelðxÞ ¼ bðxÞ
and PlðxÞ ¼ bðxÞ þ uðxÞ. However, using (Bel, Pl) instead of ðb; d; uÞ would have
produced unnecessary complexity in the product and coproduct operators described
in Sections 4 and 5. It can also be noted that our disbelief function is equivalent to
the traditional DouðxÞ (Doubt) of Shaferian belief theory so that DouðxÞ ¼ dðxÞ.
However, the interpretation of the term ‘‘doubt’’ is problematic in case of e.g. ‘‘total
doubt’’, i.e. where DouðxÞ ¼ 1, whereas the term ‘‘total disbelief’’, i.e. with dðxÞ ¼ 1
leaves little room for misinterpretation. We therefore prefer to use the term ‘‘dis-
belief’’ rather than ‘‘doubt’’.
Deﬁnition (6) is equivalent to the pignistic probability function described by
Smets and Kennes [8], and corresponds to the principle of insuﬃcient reason: a belief
mass assigned to the union of n atomic sets is split equally among these n sets.
Section 9 describes how belief functions can be mapped to b probability distribu-
tions, thereby making pignistic probability equivalent to expected probability. In
order to reﬂect this equivalence and to avoid any confusion, we prefer to use the term
2 Denoted by BelðxÞ in [5].
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‘‘probability expectation’’, denoted by EðxÞ, both for belief functions and for
probability distributions, rather than to use ‘‘pignistic probability’’ for the former
and ‘‘probability expectation’’ for the latter.
Subjective logic operators apply to binary frames of discernment, so in case a
frame is larger than binary, a coarsening is required in order to reduce its size to
binary. Coarsening in subjective logic focuses on a particular subset x  H, and
produces a binary frame of discernment X ¼ fx;xg containing x and its complement
x in H. The reduced powerset of X is 2X  f;g ¼ ffxg; fxg;Xg which has 2jX j  1 ¼ 3
elements. We will ﬁrst describe simple coarsening and subsequently describe normal
coarsening.
Let bx, dx, ux and ax denote the belief, disbelief, uncertainty and relative atomicity
functions of x on X . According to simple coarsening which is presented in [2], these
functions are deﬁned as:
bx,bðxÞ; ð8Þ
dx,dðxÞ; ð9Þ
ux,uðxÞ; ð10Þ
ax, ½EðxÞ  bðxÞ=uðxÞ: ð11Þ
This coarsening is called ‘‘simple’’ because the belief, disbelief and uncertainty
functions are identical to the original functions on H. The relative atomicity ax on
the other hand produces a synthetic relative atomicity value which does not represent
the real relative atomicity of x on H in general, but one that satisﬁes:
EðxÞ ¼ bx þ axux; ð12Þ
which is a special case of Eq. (6).
Next, the normal coarsening method is described. According to normal coars-
ening which is presented in [3], the belief, disbelief, uncertainty and relative atomicity
functions are deﬁned as:
For EðxÞP bðxÞ þ aðxÞuðxÞ:
bx,bðxÞ þ ðEðxÞ  bðxÞ  aðxÞuðxÞÞ=ð1 aðxÞÞ; ð13Þ
dx,dðxÞ; ð14Þ
ux,uðxÞ  ðEðxÞ  bðxÞ  aðxÞuðxÞÞ=ð1 aðxÞÞ; ð15Þ
ax,aðxÞ: ð16Þ
For EðxÞ < bðxÞ þ aðxÞuðxÞ:
bx,bðxÞ; ð17Þ
dx,dðxÞ þ ðbðxÞ þ aðxÞuðxÞ  EðxÞÞ=aðxÞ; ð18Þ
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ux,uðxÞ  ðbðxÞ þ aðxÞuðxÞ  EðxÞÞ=aðxÞ; ð19Þ
ax,aðxÞ: ð20Þ
This coarsening is called ‘‘normal’’ because the relative atomicity reﬂects the true
relative cardinality of an element in the original frame of discernment. It is
important to note the distinction between the relative cardinality of an element x
in its original frame of discernment, and in the coarsened binary frame of dis-
cernment. The former is expressed by the relative atomicity, and the latter is
always 0.5.
With normal coarsening, the belief, disbelief and uncertainty functions on the
focused frame of discernment X are in general diﬀerent from the belief, disbelief and
uncertainty functions on the original frame of discernment H, so that bxP bðxÞ,
dxP dðxÞ, and ux6 uðxÞ. The interpretation of the tendency of normal coarsening to
decrease the uncertainty and increase the belief and disbelief functions, is that belief
masses that contribute to the uncertainty function can represent varying amounts of
uncertainty relative to a given proposition. When considering for example the frame
of discernment H ¼ fx1; x2; x3g and the uncertainty function ux1 of normal coarsen-
ing, then the belief mass mðfx1; x2gÞ represents a smaller amount of uncertainty, and
should therefore contribute less to the uncertainty function ux1 than for example the
belief mass mðHÞ.
Simple and normal coarsening will in general produce diﬀerent results, but it can
be shown that simple and normal coarsening are equivalent iﬀ
EðxÞ ¼ bðxÞ þ aðxÞuðxÞ: ð21Þ
A coarsening for which Eq. (21) is satisﬁed will be called a Bayesian coarsening. This
will be the case when the coarsening focuses on an element in 2H that can have no
partly overlapping focal elements other than H itself. In other words, a Bayesian
coarsening partitions H in two parts x and x, where mðHÞ is the only possible belief
mass that can contribute to uncertainty about x.
In the terminology of subjective logic, an opinion xx held by an individual about a
proposition x is the ordered quadruple ðbx; dx; ux; axÞ. Note that bx, dx, ux and ax must
all fall in the closed interval ½0; 1, and bx þ dx þ ux ¼ 1. For both simple and normal
coarsening, the expected probability for x satisﬁes EðxxÞ,EðxÞ ¼ bx þ axux. Al-
though the coarsened frame of discernment X is binary, an opinion about x 2 X
carries information about the state space size of the original frame of discernment H
through the relative atomicity parameter ax.
The opinion space can be mapped into the interior of an equal-sided triangle,
where, for an opinion xx ¼ ðbx; dx; ux; axÞ, the three parameters bx, dx and ux deter-
mine the position of the point in the triangle representing the opinion. Fig. 1 illus-
trates an example where the opinion about a proposition x from a binary frame of
discernment has the value xx ¼ ð0:7; 0:1; 0:2; 0:5Þ.
The top vertex of the triangle represents uncertainty, the bottom left vertex rep-
resents disbelief, and the bottom right vertex represents belief. The parameter bx is
the value of a linear function on the triangle which takes value 0 on the edge which
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joins the uncertainty and disbelief vertices and takes value 1 at the belief vertex. In
other words, bx is equal to the quotient when the perpendicular distance between the
opinion point and the edge joining the uncertainty and disbelief vertices is divided by
the perpendicular distance between the belief vertex and the same edge. The
parameters dx and ux are determined similarly. The edge joining the disbelief and
belief vertices is called the probability axis. The relative atomicity is indicated by a
point on the probability axis, and the projector starting from the opinion point is
parallel to the line that joins the uncertainty vertex and the relative atomicity point
on the probability axis. The point at which the projector meets the probability axis
determines the probability expectation value of the opinion, i.e. it coincides with the
point corresponding to expectation value bx þ axux.
3. Products of binary frames of discernment
Multiplication and comultiplication in subjective logic are binary operators that
take opinions about two elements from distinct binary frames of discernment as
input parameters. The product and coproduct opinions relate to subsets of the
Cartesian product of the two binary frames of discernment. The Cartesian product
of the two binary frames of discernment X ¼ fx;xg and Y ¼ fy; yg produces the
quaternary set X  Y ¼ fðx; yÞ; ðx; yÞ; ðx; yÞ; ðx; yÞg which is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Let xx and xy be opinions about x and y respectively held by the same observer.
Then the product opinion xx^y is the observer’s opinion about the conjunction
x ^ y ¼ fðx; yÞg that is represented by the area inside the dotted line in Fig. 2. The
coproduct opinion xx_y is the opinion about the disjunction x _ y ¼ fðx; yÞ;
ðx; yÞ; ðx; yÞg that is represented by the area inside the dashed line in Fig. 2. Obviously
X  Y is not binary, and coarsening is required in order to determine the product
and coproduct opinions. The reduced powerset 2XY  f;g contains 2jXY j  1 ¼ 15
a
ω  = (0.7, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5)x
x
xω
xE(  )
0.5 00
1
0.5 0.5
Disbelief1 Belief10
0                                                           1
Uncertainty
Probability axis
Example opinion:
Projector
Fig. 1. Opinion triangle with example opinion.
24 A. Jøsang, D. McAnally / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 38 (2005) 19–51
elements. A short notation for the elements of 2XY is used below so that for example
fðx; yÞ; ðx; yÞg ¼ fxg  Y . The BMA on X  Y as a function of the opinions on x and
y is deﬁned by:
mðfðx; yÞgÞ ¼ bxby ; mðfðx; yÞgÞ ¼ dxby ; mðX  fygÞ ¼ uxby ;
mðfðx; yÞgÞ ¼ bxdy ; mðfðx; yÞgÞ ¼ dxdy ; mðX  fygÞ ¼ uxdy ;
mðfxg  Y Þ ¼ bxuy ; mðfxg  Y Þ ¼ dxuy ; mðX  Y Þ ¼ uxuy :
ð22Þ
It can be shown that the sum of the above belief masses always equals 1. The product
does not produce any belief mass on the following elements:
fðx; yÞ; ðx; yÞg; ðX  fygÞ [ fðx; yÞg; ðX  fygÞ [ fðx; yÞg;
fðx; yÞ; ðx; yÞg; ðX  fygÞ [ fðx; yÞg; ðX  fygÞ [ fðx; yÞgÞ:
ð23Þ
The belief functions of for example x ^ y and x _ y can now be determined so
that:
bðx ^ yÞ ¼ mðfðx; yÞgÞ;
bðx _ yÞ ¼ mðfðx; yÞgÞ þ mðfðx; yÞgÞ þ mðfðx; yÞgÞ
þ mðfxg  Y Þ þ mðX  fygÞ:
ð24Þ
The normal relative atomicity functions for x ^ y and x _ y can be determined by
working in the respective ‘‘primitive’’ frames of discernment, HX and HY which
underlie the deﬁnitions of the sets x and y, respectively. A sample yields a value of
ðx; yÞ in the frame of discernment X  Y exactly when the sample yields an atom
hX 2 x in the frame of discernment HX and an atom hY 2 y in the frame of dis-
cernment HY . In other words, a sample yields a value of ðx; yÞ in the frame of dis-
cernment X  Y exactly when the sample yields an atom ðhX ; hY Þ 2 x y in the frame
of discernmentHX HY , so that ðx; yÞ 2 X  Y corresponds to x y  HX HY in a
natural manner. Similarly, ðx; yÞ corresponds to x y, ðx; yÞ corresponds to x y,
and ðx; yÞ corresponds to x y. The normal relative atomicity function for x ^ y is
equal to:
aðx ^ yÞ ¼ jx yjjHX HY j ¼
jxjjyj
jHX jjHY j ¼
jxj
jHX j
jyj
jHY j ¼ aðxÞaðyÞ: ð25Þ
x x,y(       )y x,y
y x,y(       ) (       )x,y
(       )
YX x
x
=
YX
x
Fig. 2. Cartesian product of two binary frames of discernment.
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Similarly, the normal relative atomicity of x _ y is equal to
aðx _ yÞ ¼ jðx yÞ [ ðx yÞ [ ðx yÞjjHX HY j ¼
jx yj þ jx yj þ jx yj
jHX HY j
¼ jxjjyj þ jxjjyj þ jxjjyjjHX jjHY j ¼ aðxÞaðyÞ þ aðxÞaðyÞ þ aðxÞaðyÞ
¼ aðxÞ þ aðyÞ  aðxÞaðyÞ:
By applying simple or normal coarsening to the product frame of discernment and
BMA, the simple and normal product and coproduct opinions emerge. A coarsening
that focuses on x ^ y produces the product, and a coarsening that focuses on x _ y
produces the coproduct. A Bayesian coarsening (i.e. when simple and normal
coarsening are equivalent) is only possible in exceptional cases because some terms of
Eq. (22) other than mðX  Y Þ will in general contribute to uncertainty about x ^ y in
the case of multiplication, and to uncertainty about x _ y in the case of comultipli-
cation. Speciﬁcally, Bayesian coarsening requires mðX  fygÞ ¼ mðfxg  Y Þ ¼ 0 in
case of multiplication, and mðX  fygÞ ¼ mðfxg  Y Þ ¼ 0 in case of comultiplica-
tion. Non-Bayesian coarsenings will cause the product and coproduct of opinions to
deviate from the analytically correct product and coproduct. However, the magni-
tude of this deviation is always small, as will be explained in Section 10.
The symbols ‘‘’’ and ‘‘t’’ will be used to denote multiplication and comultipli-
cation of opinions respectively so that we can write:
xx^y,xx  xy ; ð26Þ
xx_y,xx t xy : ð27Þ
The product of the opinions about x and y is thus the opinion about the conjunction
of x and y. Similarly, the coproduct of the opinions about x and y is the opinion
about the disjunction of x and y. The exact expressions for product and coproduct
are given in Sections 4 and 5.
Readers might have noticed that Eq. (22) can appear to be a direct application of
the non-normalised version of Dempster’s rule (i.e. the conjunctive rule of combi-
nation) [5] which is a method of belief fusion. However the diﬀerence is that
Dempster’s rule applies to the beliefs of two diﬀerent and independent observers
faced with the same frame of discernment, whereas the Cartesian product of Eq. (22)
applies to the beliefs of the same observer faced with two diﬀerent and independent
frames of discernment. Let xAx and x
B
x represent the opinions of two observers A and
B about the same proposition x, and let xA;Bx represent the fusion of A and B’s
opinions. Let further xAx and x
A
y represent observer A’s opinions about the propo-
sitions x and y, and let xAx^y represent the product of those opinions. Fig. 3 illustrates
the diﬀerence between belief fusion and belief product.
The Cartesian product as described here thus has no relationship to Dempster’s
rule and belief fusion other than the apparent similarity between Eq. (22) and
Dempster’s rule.
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4. Simple multiplication and comultiplication
The product and coproduct of opinions held by a single individual with respect to
independent propositions x and y determine the individual’s opinions about their
conjunction, x ^ y, and disjunction, x _ y, respectively. The ‘‘simple’’ approach to
determining the product of opinions held by an individual about independent
propositions x and y is to note that an outcome determines that x ^ y is certainly true
if and only if the outcome determines both that x is certainly true and that y is
certainly true, so that it appears natural to take bx^y ¼ bxby . Also, we can note that
an outcome determines that x ^ y is false if and only if it determines that at least one
of x and y is false, so that it appears natural to take dx^y ¼ dx þ dy  dxdy . Since
bx^y þ dx^y þ ux^y ¼ 1, then ux^y ¼ bxuy þ uxby þ uxuy . This makes sense since an
outcome can lead to no deﬁnitive conclusion about the truth of x ^ y if and only if it
does not lead to the deﬁnite conclusion that either is false and it does not lead to the
deﬁnite conclusion that both are true, leaving only the three alternatives:
• x is deﬁnitely true and no deﬁnitive conclusion can be drawn about y;
• no deﬁnitive conclusion can be drawn about x and y is deﬁnitely true;
• no deﬁnitive conclusion can be drawn about x or y.
Since the expected probability for x is E½xx ¼ bx þ axux and the expected prob-
ability for y is E½xy  ¼ by þ ayuy , and x and y are independent, then the expected
probability for x ^ y should be E½xxE½xy , so that the relative atomicity is given by
ax^y ¼ bxayuy þ axuxby þ axuxayuybxuy þ uxby þ uxuy : ð28Þ
It is this simple product of opinions which is referred to in [2] as their propositional
conjunction. A numerical example of simple multiplication is visualised in Fig. 4. 3
Note that the relative atomicity ax^y does not reﬂect the real relative cardinality of
x ^ y in X  Y .
Similarly, the ‘‘simple’’ approach to determining the coproduct of opinions held
by an individual about independent propositions x and y is to note that an outcome
determines that x _ y is true if and only if it determines that at least one of x and y is
x
A
yω Ay
A
ω Ax    y
x         yAND
Aω x
x A,B x
A
B
xω A,B
Aω x
B
xω
[      ]
(b)(a)
Fig. 3. Conceptual diﬀerence between belief fusion and belief product. (a) Belief fusion. (b) Belief product.
3 Online demo at http://security.dstc.edu.au/spectrum/trustengine/
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true, so that it appears natural to take bx_y ¼ bx þ by  bxby . Also, we can note that
the outcome determines that x _ y is deﬁnitely false if and only if the outcome
determines both that x is deﬁnitely false and that y is deﬁnitely false, so that it
appears natural to take dx_y ¼ dxdy . Since bx_y þ dx_y þ ux_y ¼ 1, then ux_y ¼ dxuy þ
uxdy þ uxuy . This makes sense since an outcome can lead to no deﬁnitive conclusion
about the truth of x _ y if and only if it does not lead to the deﬁnite conclusion that
either is true and it does not lead to the deﬁnite conclusion that both are false,
leaving only the three alternatives:
• x is deﬁnitely false and no deﬁnitive conclusion can be drawn about y;
• no deﬁnitive conclusion can be drawn about x and y is deﬁnitely false;
• no deﬁnitive conclusion can be drawn about x or y.
Since the expected probability for x is E½xx ¼ bx þ axux and the expected prob-
ability for y is E½xy  ¼ by þ ayuy , and x and y are independent, then the expected
probability for x _ y should be E½xx þ E½xy   E½xxE½xy , so that the atomicity is
given by
ax_y ¼ 1 dxð1 ayÞuy þ ð1 axÞuxdy þ ð1 axÞuxð1 ayÞuydxuy þ uxdy þ uxuy
¼ dxayuy þ axuxdy þ ðax þ ay  axayÞuxuy
dxuy þ uxdy þ uxuy
¼ axux þ ayuy  axuxby  bxayuy  axuxayuy
ux þ uy  bxuy  uxby  uxuy :
It is this simple coproduct of opinions which is referred to in [2] as their proposi-
tional disjunction. Note that the relative atomicity ax_y does not reﬂect the real
relative cardinality of x _ y in X  Y .
Fig. 4. Visualisation of numerical example of the simple multiplication operator.
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5. Normal multiplication and comultiplication
Normal conjunction and disjunction of opinions about independent propositions
x and y are taken in such a way that the atomicities of x ^ y and x _ y are dependent
only on the atomicities of x and y, and not on the beliefs, disbeliefs and uncertainties.
By the arguments within Section 3 for justifying the relative atomicities, we can set
ax^y ¼ axay and ax_y ¼ ax þ ay  axay . This is in contrast to the case of ‘‘simple’’
conjunction and ‘‘simple’’ disjunction as discussed above, where atomicities of both
the conjunction and the disjunction are dependent on the beliefs, disbeliefs and
uncertainties of x and y. Given opinions about independent propositions, x and y,
then under normal coarsening of the BMA for the Cartesian product of the binary
frames of discernment, the normal opinion for the conjunction, x ^ y, is given by
bx^y ¼ ðbx þ axuxÞðby þ ayuyÞ  ð1 dxÞð1 dyÞaxay
1 axay
¼ bxby þ ð1 axÞaybxuy þ axð1 ayÞuxby
1 axay ;
dx^y ¼ dx þ dy  dxdy ;
ux^y ¼ ð1 dxÞð1 dyÞ  ðbx þ axuxÞðby þ ayuyÞ
1 axay
¼ uxuy þ ð1 ayÞbxuy þ ð1 axÞuxby
1 axay ;
ax^y ¼ axay :
A numerical example of the normal multiplication operator is visualised in Fig. 5.
Note that in this case, the relative atomicity ax^y is equal to the real relative cardi-
nality of x ^ y in X  Y .
Fig. 5. Visualisation of numerical example of the normal multiplication operator.
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The formulae for the opinion about x ^ y are well formed unless ax ¼ 1 and
ay ¼ 1, in which case the opinions xx and xy can be regarded as limiting values, and
the product is determined by the relative rates of approach of ax and ay to 1. Spe-
ciﬁcally, if g is the limit of 1ax
1ay, then
bx^y ¼ bxby þ gbxuy þ uxbygþ 1 ;
dx^y ¼ dx þ dy  dxdy ;
ux^y ¼ uxuy þ bxuy þ guxbygþ 1 ;
ax^y ¼ 1:
Under normal coarsening of the BMA for the Cartesian product of the binary
frames of discernment, the normal opinion for the disjunction, x _ y, is given by
bx_y ¼ bx þ by  bxby ;
dx_y ¼ ð1 ðbx þ axuxÞÞð1 ðby þ ayuyÞÞ  ð1 bxÞð1 byÞð1 axÞð1 ayÞax þ ay  axay
¼ ðdx þ ð1 axÞuxÞðdy þ ð1 ayÞuyÞ  ð1 bxÞð1 byÞð1 axÞð1 ayÞ
ax þ ay  axay
¼ dxdy þ axð1 ayÞdxuy þ ð1 axÞayuxdyax þ ay  axay ;
ux_y ¼ ð1 bxÞð1 byÞ  ð1 ðbx þ axuxÞÞð1 ðby þ ayuyÞÞax þ ay  axay
¼ ð1 bxÞð1 byÞ  ðdx þ ð1 axÞuxÞðdy þ ð1 ayÞuyÞ
ax þ ay  axay
¼ uxuy þ aydxuy þ axuxdyax þ ay  axay ;
ax_y ¼ ax þ ay  axay :
A numerical example of the normal comultiplication operator is visualised in Fig. 6.
Note that in this case, the relative atomicity ax_y is equal to the real relative cardi-
nality of x _ y in X  Y .
The formulae for the opinion about x _ y are well formed unless ax ¼ 0 and
ay ¼ 0. In the case that ax ¼ ay ¼ 0, the opinions xx and xy can be regarded as
limiting values, and the product is determined by the relative rates of approach of ax
and ay to 0. Speciﬁcally, if f is the limit of axay, then
bx_y ¼ bx þ by  bxby ;
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dx_y ¼ dxdy þ fdxuy þ uxdyfþ 1 ;
ux_y ¼ uxuy þ dxuy þ fuxdyfþ 1 ;
ax_y ¼ 0:
This is a self-dual system under b$ d, u $ u, a $ 1 a, and ^ $ _, that is, for
example, the expressions for bx^y and dx_y are dual to each other, and one determines
the other by the correspondence, and similarly for the other expressions. This is
equivalent to the observation that the opinions satisfy de Morgan’s Laws, i.e.
xx^y ¼ xx_y and xx_y ¼ xx^y .
However it should be noted that multiplication and comultiplication are not
distributive over each other, i.e. for example that:
xx^ðy_zÞ 6¼ xðx^yÞ_ðx^zÞ: ð29Þ
This is to be expected because if x, y and z are independent, then x ^ y and x ^ z are
not generally independent in probability calculus. In fact the corresponding result
only holds for binary logic.
6. Normal division and codivision
The inverse operation to multiplication is division. The quotient of opinions
about propositions x and y represents the opinion about a proposition z which is
independent of y such that xx ¼ xy^z. This requires that ax6 ay , dxP dy , and
bxP
axð1 ayÞð1 dxÞby
ð1 axÞayð1 dyÞ ;
Fig. 6. Visualisation of numerical example of the normal comultiplication operator.
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uxP
ð1 ayÞð1 dxÞuy
ð1 axÞð1 dyÞ :
The opinion ðbx^y ; dx^y ; ux^y ; ax ^yÞ, which is the quotient of the opinion about x and
the opinion about y, is given by
bx^y ¼ ayðbx þ axuxÞðay  axÞðby þ ayuyÞ 
axð1 dxÞ
ðay  axÞð1 dyÞ ;
dx^y ¼ dx  dy
1 dy ;
ux^y ¼ ayð1 dxÞðay  axÞð1 dyÞ 
ayðbx þ axuxÞ
ðay  axÞðby þ ayuyÞ ;
ax^y ¼ axay ;
if ax < ay . If 0 < ax ¼ ay , then the conditions required so that the opinion about x can
be divided by the opinion about y are
bx ¼ ð1 dxÞby
1 dy ;
ux ¼ ð1 dxÞuy
1 dy ;
and in this case,
dx^y ¼ dx  dy
1 dy ;
ax^y ¼ 1:
The only information available about bx ^y and ux^y is that
bx^y þ ux^y ¼ 1 dx
1 dy :
On the other hand, bx ^y and ux^y can be determined if the opinion about x is con-
sidered as the limiting value of other opinions which can be divided by the opinion
about y. The limiting value of the quotient of the opinions is determined by the
relative rates of approach of ax, bx and ux to their limits. Speciﬁcally, if c is the limit
of
ayð1 ayÞ
ðay  axÞðby þ ayuyÞ
ð1 dyÞbx
1 dx

 by

þ by
by þ ayuy ;
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then 06 c6 1, and the limiting values of bx^y and ux ^y are
bx^y ¼ cð1 dxÞ
1 dy ;
ux^y ¼ ð1 cÞð1 dxÞ
1 dy :
The inverse operation to comultiplication is codivision. The co-quotient of opinions
about propositions x and y represents the opinion about a proposition z which is
independent of y such that xx ¼ xy_z. This requires that axP ay , bxP by , and
dxP
ð1 axÞayð1 bxÞdy
axð1 ayÞð1 byÞ ;
uxP
ayð1 bxÞuy
axð1 byÞ :
The opinion ðbx_y ; dx_y ; ux_y ; ax_yÞ, which is the co-quotient of the opinion about x and
the opinion about y, is given by
bx_y ¼ bx  by
1 by ;
dx_y ¼ ð1 ayÞð1 ðbx þ axuxÞÞðax  ayÞð1 ðby þ ayuyÞÞ 
ð1 axÞð1 bxÞ
ðax  ayÞð1 byÞ
¼ ð1 ayÞðdx þ ð1 axÞuxÞðax  ayÞðdy þ ð1 ayÞuyÞ 
ð1 axÞð1 bxÞ
ðax  ayÞð1 byÞ ;
ux_y ¼ ð1 ayÞð1 bxÞðax  ayÞð1 byÞ 
ð1 ayÞð1 ðbx þ axuxÞÞ
ðax  ayÞð1 ðby þ ayuyÞÞ
¼ ð1 ayÞð1 bxÞðax  ayÞð1 byÞ 
ð1 ayÞðdx þ ð1 axÞuxÞ
ðax  ayÞðdy þ ð1 ayÞuyÞ ;
ax_y ¼ ax  ay
1 ay ;
if ax > ay . If ax ¼ ay < 1, then the conditions required so that the opinion about x can
be codivided by the opinion about y are
dx ¼ ð1 bxÞdy
1 by ;
ux ¼ ð1 bxÞuy
1 by ;
and in this case,
bx_y ¼ bx  by
1 by ;
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ax_y ¼ 0:
The only information available about dx_y and ux_y is that
dx_y þ ux_y ¼ 1 bx
1 by :
On the other hand, dx_y and ux_y can be determined if the opinion about x is con-
sidered as the limiting value of other opinions which can be codivided by the opinion
about y. The limiting value of the co-quotient of the opinions is determined by the
relative rates of approach of ax, dx and ux to their limits. Speciﬁcally, if d is the limit
of
ayð1 ayÞ
ðax  ayÞðdy þ ð1 ayÞuyÞ
ð1 byÞdx
1 bx

 dy

þ dy
dy þ ð1 ayÞuy ;
then 06 d6 1, and the limiting values of dx_y and ux_y are
dx_y ¼ dð1 bxÞ
1 by ;
ux_y ¼ ð1 dÞð1 bxÞ
1 by :
Given the opinion about x and the atomicity of y, it is possible to use the triangular
representation of the opinion space from Fig. 1 to describe geometrically the range of
opinions about x ^ y and x _ y.
In the case of x ^ y, take the projector for xx, and take the intersections of the
projector with the line of zero uncertainty and the line of zero belief (A and B,
respectively). The intersection, A, with the line of zero uncertainty determines the
probability expectation value of xx. Take the point, C, on the line of zero uncertainty
whose distance from the disbelief vertex is ay times the distance between the disbelief
vertex and A. Take the line BC and the line through A parallel to BC. Let D and E be
the intersections of these lines with the line of constant disbelief through xx, so that
the disbelief is equal to dx. Then xx^y falls in the closed triangle determined by D, E
and the disbelief vertex, and the atomicity of x ^ y is given by ax^y ¼ axay .
In Fig. 7, this is demonstrated with an example where xx ¼ ð0:3; 0:3; 0:4; 0:6Þ and
ay ¼ 0:4. The opinion xx has been marked with a small black circle (on the side of the
shaded triangle opposite the disbelief vertex). The intersections A and B of the
projector of x with the line of zero uncertainty and the line of zero belief, respec-
tively, have been marked. The point C has been placed on the probability axis so that
its distance from the disbelief vertex is 0.4 times the distance between A and the
disbelief vertex (since ay ¼ 0:4). The line BC, whose direction corresponds to an
atomicity of 0.24 (i.e. the atomicity of x ^ y), has also been drawn in the triangle, and
its intersection with the line of constant disbelief through xx (with disbelief equal to
0.3) has been marked with a white circle. This is the point D, although not marked as
such in the ﬁgure. The line through A parallel to BC has also been drawn in the
triangle, and its intersection with the line of constant disbelief through xx (the point
E, although also not marked as such) has also been marked with a white circle. The
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triangle with vertices D, E and the disbelief vertex has been shaded, and the normal
product xx^y of the opinions must fall within the shaded triangle or on its boundary.
In other words, the closure of the shaded triangle is the range of all possible values
for the opinion xx^y .
In the case of x _ y, take the projector for xx, and take the intersections of this line
with the line of zero uncertainty and the line of zero disbelief (A and B, respectively).
The intersection, A, with the line of zero uncertainty determines the probability
expectation value of xx. Take the point, C, on the line of zero uncertainty whose
distance from the belief vertex is 1 ay times the distance between the belief vertex
and A. Take the line BC and the line through A parallel to BC. Let D and E be
the intersections of these lines with the line of constant belief through xx, so that the
belief is equal to bx. Then xx_y falls in the closed triangle determined by D, E and the
belief vertex, and the atomicity of x _ y is given by ax_y ¼ ax þ ay  axay .
The conditions required so that xx can be divided by xy can be described geo-
metrically. Take the projector for xy , and take the intersections of this line with the
line of zero uncertainty and with the line of zero belief. Take the lines through each
of these points which are parallel to the projector for xx (it is required that ax < ay).
Take the intersections of these lines with the line of constant disbelief through xy .
Then xx can be divided by xy , provided xx falls in the closed triangle determined by
these two points and the disbelief vertex.
Fig. 7 can be used to demonstrate. If xy ¼ ð0:3; 0:3; 0:4; 0:6Þ and ax ¼ 0:24, then
the black circle denotes xy , the projector of y is the line AB, the lines through A and B
parallel to the director for atomicity 0.24 are drawn in the triangle, and their
intersections with the line of constant disbelief through xy are marked by the white
circles. The closure of the shaded triangle is the range of all possible values of xx that
allow xx to be divided by xy .
The conditions required so that xx can be codivided by xy can be described
geometrically. Take the projector for xy , and take the intersections of this line with
Fig. 7. Range of possible opinions for normal product.
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the line of zero uncertainty and with the line of zero disbelief. Take the lines through
each of these points which are parallel to the projector for xx (it is required that
ax > ay). Take the intersections of these lines with the line of constant belief through
xy . Then xx can be codivided by xy , provided xx falls in the closed triangle deter-
mined by these two points and the belief vertex.
7. Probability distributions over subsets of H
In the previous sections, two variants of the multiplication and comultiplication
operators were described. In order to interpret these operators and assess their
correctness, we will deﬁne a mapping between opinions and b probability distribu-
tions. The purpose of this is to be able to compare products of opinions with
products of b distributions, and similarly for coproducts. Ideally, they should be
equivalent, but unfortunately that is not always possible.
For this analysis, we are interested in knowing the probability distribution over
subsets of the frame of discernment. In the binary case it is determined by the b
distribution. In the case of exhaustive and mutually exclusive subsets, it is deter-
mined by the Dirichlet distribution which we explain in some detail in this section.
The Dirichlet distribution describes the joint distribution of k random variables
fPigki¼1 (or equivalently, a k-component random variable ðPiÞki¼1) with sample space
½0; 1k, subject to
Xk
i¼1
Pi ¼ 1;
so that in fact, the sample space is actually
ðpiÞki¼1 2 ½0; 1k :
Xk
i¼1
pi
(
¼ 1
)
;
of dimension k  1 (i.e. the sample space has k  1 degrees of freedom). Note that for
any sample from a Dirichlet random variable, it is suﬃcient to determine values for
Pi for any k  1 elements i of f1; . . . ; kg, as this uniquely determines the value of the
other variable. The Dirichlet distribution has k positive real parameters ðaiÞki¼1, each
corresponding to one of the random variables, and the probability distribution
function for ðPiÞk1i¼1 on the sample space
ðpiÞk1i¼1 2 ½0; 1k1 :
Xk1
i¼1
pi
(
6 1
)
is given by
f ðp1; . . . ; pk1Þ ¼
C
Pk
i¼1 ai
 
Qk
i¼1 CðaiÞ
Yk
i¼1
pai1i ;
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where pk ¼ 1
Pk1
i¼1 pi. Note that although the deﬁnition of Dirichlet random
variable is symmetric, the probability density is not symmetrically deﬁned (pk is not
an argument of the probability distribution function). The same functional form for
the probability distribution function arises for any choice of k  1 of the component
random variables (since the Jacobian of the transformations between such subsets
always has absolute value 1).
We now ask what happens if instead of ðPiÞki¼1, we take sums of the random
variables, so we are interested in the distribution of
X
i2J
Pi
 !
J2P
;
for nontrivial partitions P of f1; . . . ; kg (i.e. any partition not consisting of the
elements f1; . . . ; kg and ;). The distribution is given by:
Theorem 7.1. If ðPiÞki¼1  Dirichletða1; . . . ; akÞ, thenX
i2J
Pi
 !
J2P
 Dirichlet
X
i2J
ai
 !
J2P
;
i.e. the distribution is still a Dirichlet distribution, and the parameter corresponding to a
specific sum of random variables is given by the sum of the parameters corresponding to
the constituent addends.
The proof of this theorem can be found in standard textbooks, and is also given in
the Appendix A. It follows that for any nontrivial subset J of f1; . . . ; kg (i.e. any
subset J not equal to f1; . . . ; kg or ;),Pi2J Pj is a b distributed random variable with
parameters
P
i2J ai and
P
i2J 0 ai, where J
0 ¼ f1; . . . ; kg n J , i.e.
X
i2J
Pi  b
X
i2J
ai;
X
i2J 0
ai
 !
:
This is because a random variable P  bða; bÞ if and only if ðP ; 1 P Þ 
Dirichletða; bÞ.
In plain language this means that when a Dirichlet distribution can be deﬁned
over an exhaustive and mutually exclusive partitioning of the frame of discernment,
it is possible to deﬁne a b probability distribution over any binary coarsening of
this partitioning. This corresponds to the Bayesian coarsening that was deﬁned in
Section 2.
8. A priori distribution for k alternatives
Now, we come to the question of an a priori distribution function for the prob-
abilities of k exhaustive and mutually exclusive alternatives (e.g. k diﬀerent colours of
balls in an urn). Let Pi denote the random variable describing the probability of a
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random sample (e.g. drawing a ball) yielding alternative i. Since Pi describes a
probability, then the sample space for ðPiÞki¼1 is ½0; 1k. Since the alternatives are
exhaustive and mutually exclusive, then
Xk
i¼1
Pi ¼ 1:
Generalising the case of 2 alternatives (with their b distribution), we will take an a
priori Dirichlet distribution. Since there is no reason to assume a preference for any
alternative over any other alternative, then the parameters will be taken to be equal
(with the result that E½Pi ¼ 1k for all i). In the case of 2 alternatives, a uniform dis-
tribution has been assumed (i.e. bð1; 1Þ). The question arises as to whether this fact
can be used to determine the common value of the parameters in the case of k
alternatives on the grounds of consistency. It can be argued that such a determi-
nation is possible, and that the common value of the parameters is 2k. The argument
goes as follows. For integers m and n, take a set of mn exhaustive mutually exclusive
alternatives, and a partition of the set into m classes, each with n elements. The a
priori distribution for the probabilities of the mn alternatives is a Dirichlet distri-
bution with the common value of the parameters being given by aðmnÞ (here, aðkÞ
denotes the common value of the parameters in the case where there are k alterna-
tives). It follows that for the partition, the distribution for the probabilities of the m
alternative classes is a Dirichlet distribution with a common value for the parame-
ters, equal to naðmnÞ. Since the m classes are exhaustive mutually exclusive alter-
natives in their own right, with no reason for preference for any over the others, then
the distribution for the probabilities should have a common value of the parameters
equal to aðmÞ, and so consistency requires that aðmÞ ¼ naðmnÞ. Since
maðmÞ ¼ mnaðmnÞ ¼ naðnÞ;
for all positive integers m, n, then aðnÞ ¼ Cn for some constant C. Substituting
að2Þ ¼ 1 (corresponding to the uniform distribution in the case of 2 alternatives),
then C ¼ 2, and the common value of the parameters in the case of k alternatives is 2k.
Let J be an l-element subset of f1; . . . ; kg, then
X
i2J
Pi  b 2lk ;
2ðk  lÞ
k
 
:
This means that, in the case of variously coloured balls in an urn, if the expected a
priori probability of picking a ball of a given colour in the absence of bias is a, then
the a priori distribution for the probability is:
bð2a; 2ð1 aÞÞ; ð30Þ
and it seems reasonable to extend this assumption to the more general case (i.e. in
any binary event, if the expected a priori probability in the absence of bias is a, then
an a priori distribution according to Eq. (30) will be assumed). Bayesian updating
now allows new evidence to be added. Let r be the number of observed events of type
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x, and let s denote the number of observed events diﬀerent from x, then the updated b
distribution can be expressed as:
bðr þ 2a; sþ 2ð1 aÞÞ: ð31Þ
For example, if an observer is presented with an urn containing red and black balls,
without knowing the proportion of each colour, then there is no reason to expect that
the probability of picking a red ball should be greater or less than the probability of
picking a black ball, so the a priori probability of picking a red ball is a ¼ 0:5, and the
a priori b distribution is bð1; 1Þ. Assume that the observer picks 8 balls of which 7 turn
out to be red and only one turns out to be black. The updated b distribution of the
outcome of picking red balls is bð8; 2Þ which is illustrated in Fig. 8.
So far so good. However everything is not as simple as it seems, because there are
cases where the a priori distribution for the probability in the absence of bias can not
be determined according to the above analysis.
Take for example the following case where an event whose expected probability in
the absence of bias is a ¼ 1
4
, but whose a priori distribution for the probability is not
bð1
2
; 3
2
Þ as Eq. (30) would dictate.
Theorem 8.1. Let Q and R be independent random variables, with identical uniform
distributions over ½0; 1 (so Q  bð1; 1Þ and R  bð1; 1Þ), then the probability distri-
bution function for the random variable P ¼ QR is given by f ðpÞ ¼  ln p for
0 < p < 1.
The proof of this theorem is given in the Appendix A. Speciﬁcally, this means that
if Q and R are random variables representing the probabilities of propositions x and y
(which are independent), with Q and R having a priori uniform distributions, then P
represents the probability of the conjunction x ^ y, and has probability distribution
function f ðpÞ ¼  ln p with probability expectation value 1
4
.
This is the case of the independent propositions x and y, where we are taking four
exhaustive and mutually exclusive propositions ðx ^ y; x ^ y;x ^ y;x ^ yÞ with no
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
p
1
2
3
4
5
β (8,2)
β (α,β)
Fig. 8. b distribution after 7 positive and 1 negative observations.
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reason for preferring any of the propositions over any of the others. As Theorem 8.1
shows, the distribution function for the probability of x ^ y is  ln p for 0 < p < 1.
Note that in the absence of bias, the probabilities of x and y are each expected to be 1
2
,
so that the probability of x ^ y is expected to be 1
4
.
We will contrast this with the case of four exhaustive and mutually exclusive
propositions x1, x2, x3, x4, with no reason for preferring any of these propositions
over any of the others. The a priori distribution of the corresponding probabilities is
Dirichlet ð1
2
; 1
2
; 1
2
; 1
2
Þ, so that the a priori probability distribution for the probability of
x1 is bðð12 ; 32Þ, again with probability expectation value 14.
The diﬀerence between bð1
2
; 3
2
Þ, which is derivable from Dirichlet ð1
2
; 1
2
; 1
2
; 1
2
Þ, and
 ln p is illustrated in Fig. 9.
So why the diﬀerence? The one feature that is diﬀerent between the two cases is
that, in the case of the conjunction x ^ y, we have additional information about the
probabilities. Speciﬁcally, since x and y are independent, then
P ðx ^ yÞP ðx ^ yÞ ¼ Pðx ^ yÞP ðx ^ yÞ; ð32Þ
and we have no such relation for P ðx1Þ, Pðx2Þ, P ðx3Þ, P ðx4Þ. The result is that the two
sets of circumstances are not identical. In the case of x1, x2, x3, x4, if the random
variable W describes Pðx1Þ, so W  bð12 ; 32Þ, then E½W  ¼ 14 and E½W 2 ¼ 18, so that
Var½W  ¼ 1
16
. In the case of the two independent uniform random variables (where P
denotes the random variable P ðx ^ yÞ), E½P  ¼ 1
4
and E½P 2 ¼ 1
9
, so that Var½P  ¼ 7
144
.
The fact that the variance of P is smaller than the variance of W reﬂects the fact that
we have more information about P , and that we are therefore less uncertain about P .
9. Mapping between opinions and b distributions
The correspondence between opinions expressed as quadruples ðbx; dx; ux; axÞ and
b distributions expressed as bða; bÞ is not immediately obvious. However, it is pos-
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
p
1
2
3
4
5
f
–ln p
1    3β( )__  __2 ,  2
Fig. 9. Comparison between b 1
2
; 3
2
 
and product of uniform distributions.
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sible to ﬁx certain requirements for the b distribution which corresponds with a given
opinion. Note that the space of opinions has three degrees of freedom (there are four
variables, bx, dx, ux and ax and one relation bx þ dx þ ux ¼ 1), and the space of b
distributions has two degrees of freedom (because it has two parameters), so most of
the b distributions which correspond to an opinion can be expected to correspond to
a continuum of opinions, with one degree of freedom. Since an opinion has an
expectation value for the probability, i.e. EðxÞ ¼ bx þ axux, and the b distribution has
an expectation value for the probability, i.e. EðP Þ ¼ aaþb, then the ﬁrst requirement
will be that the expectation value for the probability for the opinion be equal to the
probability expectation value for the b distribution, i.e.:
a
aþ b ¼ bx þ axux; or equivalently;
b
aþ b ¼ dx þ ð1 axÞux: ð33Þ
Secondly, if the uncertainty decreases while the probability expectation value for the
opinion and the atomicity remain constant, then that reﬂects a greater conﬁdence in
the individual that the probability that the system is in the state x is given by
EðxÞ ¼ bx þ axux (the size of the ‘‘interval of conﬁdence’’, between bx and 1 dx
decreases as ux decreases-meanwhile, both bx and dx increase as uncertainty is
redistributed to belief and disbelief). The corresponding requirement for the b dis-
tribution is that the variance for the b distribution should decrease to reﬂect the
greater conﬁdence in the expectation value. Since the probability expectation value is
being held constant, then ab is being held constant while a and b each vary individ-
ually. The variance of the b distribution is expressed by the formula:
VarðP Þ ¼ abðaþ bÞ2ðaþ bþ 1Þ ¼
EðP Þð1 EðPÞÞ
aþ bþ 1 : ð34Þ
From the above expression it can be seen that if a and b vary in such a manner that ab
remains constant, then the variance decreases as a and b increase, and the variance
increases as a and b decrease. As a result, if the uncertainty decreases while the
probability expectation value and the atomicity of the opinion remain constant, then
a and b must increase in such a manner that ab remains constant.
Finally, if the uncertainty ux is equal to zero, that represents the dogmatic opinion
that the probability that the system is in the state x is bx and the probability that the
system is in the state x is dx (since bx þ dx ¼ 1 in this case, then the laws of probability
are still satisﬁed). Since the opinion is dogmatic, the variance of the corresponding b
distribution must be zero. This is actually impossible, so the only means of satisfying
this particular requirement is to take the limit as a and b approach inﬁnity in such a
manner that ab approaches
bx
dx
.
In summary, a and b must be functionally dependent on bx, dx, ux and ax in such a
manner that
(1) a=b ¼ ðbx þ axuxÞ=½dx þ ð1 axÞux,
(2) if ax remains constant, and bx, dx and ux vary in such a manner that bx þ axux re-
mains constant, then ab remains constant (as required by the ﬁrst condition) and a
and b increase as ux decreases, and a and b decrease as ux increases,
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(3) as ux approaches zero, then a and b approach inﬁnity in such a manner that ab
approaches the limiting value of bxdx.
The ﬁrst requirement is satisﬁed exactly when there exists a function c such that
a ¼ ðbx þ axuxÞc and b ¼ ðdx þ ð1 axÞuxÞc. The second and third requirement now
reduce to the statements that as ux decreases while ax and bx þ axux remain constant,
c must increase, and as ux approaches zero, c must approach inﬁnity. After this
substitution for a and b, the variance of the b distribution is given by
VarðP Þ ¼ ðbx þ axuxÞðdx þ ð1 axÞuxÞ
cþ 1 ¼
EðxÞð1 EðxÞÞ
cþ 1 ; ð35Þ
thus demonstrating explicitly that the variance decreases as c increases.
One suggestion that would satisfy the requirements for c is c ¼ d=unx for some
function d and some positive real number n such that d=unx increases as ux decreases
while holding bx þ axux and ax ﬁxed, and such that d approaches a positive function
of bx, dx and ax as ux approaches zero.
One possible solution to the problem is to take the case where a ¼ r þ R and
b ¼ sþ S, where r is the amount of evidence gathered in favour of the system being
in the state x, s is the amount of evidence gathered in favour of the system being in
the state x, and R and S are constants to be determined. Since the belief should relate
to r (i.e. the amount of evidence in favour of x) and the disbelief should relate in the
same manner to s (i.e. the amount of evidence in favour of x), and in an original state
of ignorance, bx and dx should both be equal to zero in the absence of evidence, i.e. if
r ¼ s ¼ 0, then since r þ R ¼ ðbx þ axuxÞc and sþ S ¼ ðdx þ ð1 axÞuxÞc, these con-
ditions are satisﬁed when r ¼ bxc, s ¼ dxc, R ¼ axuxc and S ¼ ð1 axÞuxc, so that
c ¼ RþSux , and R ¼ Tax and S ¼ T ð1 axÞ, where T could still be dependent on ax. This
falls under the previous categorisation with d ¼ T and n ¼ 1, provided T is positive
for all values of ax. This solution yields
a ¼ Tbx
ux
þ Tax;
b ¼ Tdx
ux
þ T ð1 axÞ:
ð36Þ
For this correspondence between opinion and b distribution, the variance of the b
distribution is given by
VarðP Þ ¼ ðbx þ axuxÞðdx þ ð1 axÞuxÞux
T þ ux ¼
EðxÞð1 EðxÞÞux
T þ ux : ð37Þ
One can use the arguments from Section 8 to justify that it is reasonable to take T
constant, and in [2], T was taken to be constant, and set equal to 2, so that in the
absence of evidence, when the atomicity is 1
2
, the a priori distribution is uniform (this
requirement forces a choice of T ¼ 2). This particular correspondence can be de-
scribed as:
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ðbx; dx; ux; axÞ7!b 2bxux

þ 2ax; 2dxux þ 2ð1 axÞ

: ð38Þ
As already mentioned, the b distribution really only has two degrees of freedom, so
that there will always be ranges of values in the expression for the opinion in Eq. (38)
which actually produce the same b parameters. This will be the case for the ranges of
ðbx; dx; ux; axÞ values where ux and EðxÞ ¼ bx þ axux are constant.
By comparing the parameters of the b distribution in Eq. (38) with those in Eq.
(31) it can be seen that the relative atomicity in fact deﬁnes the a priori parameters of
b distribution expressed by:
b 2ax; 2ð1ð  axÞÞ: ð39Þ
By considering the a priori b parameters as separate from the evidence parameters
r ¼ 2bx=ux and s ¼ 2dx=ux the expression for the b distribution gets 3 degrees of
freedom so that in fact a bijective mapping can be deﬁned between the expression for
opinions and the augmented expression for b distributions. Let Eq. (31) deﬁne the
augmented b distribution representation, i.e. as:
bðr þ 2a; sþ 2ð1 aÞÞ;
which distinguishes between a priori and a posteriori information, then a bijective
mapping between opinions and augmented b distributions can be deﬁned as:
2bx=ux $ r;
2dx=ux $ s;
ax $ a:
ð40Þ
It can be noted that under this correspondence the example opinion of Fig. 1 and the
b distribution of Fig. 8 are equivalent.
Under the correspondence of Eq. (40), as ux becomes small, the variance is
approximately proportional to ux, so that the width of the distribution (which is
characterised by the standard deviation) is approximately proportional to the square
root of ux. This means that for ux small, there is a signiﬁcant probability that the
probability p that the system is in the state x will either fall below bx or exceed 1 dx,
and in fact, as ux becomes small, the probability that p will fall between bx and 1 dx
will also become small (proportional to the square root of ux), approaching zero as ux
approaches zero. The probability that p falls below bx approaches 12 in the limit, and
the probability that p exceeds 1 dx also approaches 12 in the limit. This is not very
satisfying since intuitively, bx should represent the smallest practical value that p can
take, and 1 dx should represent the largest practical value that p can take. Most
authors in the belief theory community, including Shafer [6], reject the idea that a
belief function represents a lower probability, and so from the Shaferian point of
view, this objection, that bx does not represent the smallest practical value that p can
take and 1 dx does not represent the largest practical value that p can take, is not
really a valid objection to the correspondence between opinion and b distribution
currently used.
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While Eq. (40) provides a bijective (one-to-one) mapping from opinions to aug-
mented b distributions, we would also like to know the correspondence between
BMAs and b distributions. The simple and normal coarsenings described in Section
2 deﬁne two diﬀerent surjective (onto) correspondences from BMAs to opinions. It
was noted that simple coarsening has the drawback that the relative atomicity in
general does not reﬂect the real relative cardinality, whereas normal coarsening has
the drawback that the belief, disbelief and uncertainty parameters must be adjusted.
It was also shown that these drawbacks disappear when the two coarsenings produce
equal results, which is the case when Eq. (21) is satisﬁed. The various correspon-
dences are illustrated in Fig. 10.
Because the correspondence of Eq. (40) is bijective, there exists a surjective
mapping from BMAs to b distributions. The fact that there are two diﬀerent map-
pings from BMAs to opinions can be problematic, because in practical situations,
one of them must be selected. In general, normal coarsening provides the best
interpretation of BMAs in terms of opinions because of the correct relative atom-
icity. The next section also shows that normal multiplication and comultiplication
provides the best approximation of the product and coproduct of b distributions.
10. Comparison of multiplication and comultiplication operators
For the purpose of comparing simple and normal multiplication with multipli-
cation of b distributions, we denote by bðxxÞ and bðxyÞ the b distributions corre-
sponding to the opinions xx and xy respectively, and by bðxxÞ  bðxyÞ the product of
bðxxÞ and bðxyÞ. Further we denote by bðxSx^yÞ and bðxNx^yÞ the b distributions
corresponding to the simple and normal product opinions xSx^y and x
N
x^y respectively.
Similarly we denote by bðxxÞ t bðxyÞ the coproduct of bðxxÞ and bðxyÞ, and by
bðxSx_yÞ and bðxNx_yÞ the b distributions corresponding to the simple and normal
coproduct opinions xSx_y and x
N
x_yrespectively.
Given the interpretation of opinions as b distributions, and assuming the product
and coproduct of b distributions to be analytically correct, it would have been desirable
to have multiplication and comultiplication operators for opinions satisfying:
bðxx^yÞ ¼ bðxxÞ  bðxyÞ; ð41Þ
bðxx_yÞ ¼ bðxxÞ t bðxyÞ: ð42Þ
It is known that if the probabilities of independent propositions x and y have b
distributions, then the probabilities of x ^ y and x _ y do not have b distributions,
Augmented
β distribution
representation
bijective
mapping
Eq.(41)Opinion
representation
surjective
mappings
Simple coarsening
Bayesian coarsening
Normal coarsening
Θ
BMA
Fig. 10. Correspondence between BMAs, opinions and b distributions.
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except under extraordinary circumstances, i.e. it can happen, but such a happen-
stance is an exception rather than the rule. It is thus impossible for the multiplication
and comultiplication operators described in Sections 4 and 5 to satisfy Eqs. (41) and
(42) in general. The deviation between the left and right sides of Eqs. (41) and (42) is
partly due to non-Bayesian coarsening of X  Y as explained in Section 2, and partly
due to the diﬀerence in circumstances around the a priori probability distributions
over the conjunction and disjunction of two independent variables x and y, and four
exhaustive and mutually exclusive variables ðx1; x2; x3; x4Þ, as explained in Section 8.
In the following we will try to determine how close the multiplication and comul-
tiplication operators are to satisfying Eqs. (41) and (42).
First we compare the characteristics of the simple product bðxSx^yÞ with the nor-
mal product bðxNx^yÞ, and then the simple coproduct bðxSx_yÞ with the normal
coproduct bðxNx_yÞ. We then compare the characteristics of the product bðxxÞ  bðxyÞ
with the characteristics of the products bðxSx^yÞ and bðxNx^yÞ. Similarly we compare
the coproduct bðxxÞ t bðxyÞ with the characteristics of the coproducts bðxSx_yÞ and
bðxNx_yÞ. The various comparisons are illustrated in Fig. 11.
The b distribution corresponding to the normal opinion product xNx^y is given by
bðxNx^yÞ ¼ b
2FG
H  F ;
2ð1 F ÞG
H  F
 
; ð43Þ
where F ¼ ðbx þ axuxÞðby þ ayuyÞ, G ¼ 1 axay , and H ¼ ð1 dxÞð1 dyÞ.
Since the parameters of bðxNx^yÞ are greater than the parameters of bðxSx^yÞ, then
the variance of bðxNx^yÞ is less than the variance of bðxSx^yÞ. This reﬂects the fact that
the uncertainty of the normal opinion product is less than the uncertainty of the
simple opinion product.
Similarly, the variance of bðxNx_yÞ is less than the variance of bðxSx_yÞ, reﬂecting the
fact that the uncertainty of the normal opinion coproduct is less than the uncertainty
of the simple opinion coproduct.
The ﬁrst and second moments of bðxNx^yÞ and bðxSx^yÞ can be compared to the ﬁrst
and second moments of bðxxÞ  bðxyÞ, and similarly for the coproducts. Since the
ﬁrst and second moments of a random variable P  bða; bÞ are given by:
E½P  ¼ a
aþ b ;
E½P 2 ¼ aðaþ 1Þðaþ bÞðaþ bþ 1Þ ;
)(β)(β yx ωω ⋅
)(β S yx∧ω )(β N yx∧ω
)(β)(β yx ωω
)(β S yx∨ω )(β N yx∨ω
(a) (b)
Fig. 11. Illustration of comparisons. (a) Product comparisons (b) Coproduct comparisons.
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then with the map from opinion representation to b distribution representation given
by Eq. (40), the probability expectation value is given by E½Px ¼ bx þ axux, where Px
is the random variable denoting the probability of x, and the ﬁrst and second mo-
ments are related by
E½P 2x  ¼
E½PxðE½Px þ ux2 Þ
1þ ux
2
¼ E½Pxð2E½Px þ uxÞ
2þ ux :
As a result, the ﬁrst and second moments of the product and coproduct of b dis-
tributions (i.e. bðxxÞ  bðxyÞ and bðxxÞ t bðxyÞ) of independent propositions can be
calculated, and these moments can be compared to the moments of the b distribu-
tions corresponding to opinion products (i.e. bðxSx^yÞ and bðxNx^yÞ) and coproducts
(i.e. bðxSx_yÞ and bðxNx_yÞ).
For the simple and normal products bðxSx^yÞ and bðxNx^yÞ, the value of the ﬁrst
moment (i.e. the probability expectation value) is the same as the ﬁrst moment of
bðxxÞ  bðxyÞ, given by:
Eðx ^ yÞ ¼ ðbx þ axuxÞðby þ ayuyÞ: ð44Þ
Similarly for the simple and normal coproducts bðxNx_yÞ and bðxSx_yÞ, the value of the
ﬁrst moment (i.e. the probability expectation value) is the same as the ﬁrst moment
of bðxxÞ t bðxyÞ which is given by:
Eðx _ yÞ ¼ bx þ axux þ by þ ayuy  ðbx þ axuxÞðby þ ayuyÞ: ð45Þ
Both of these results are to be expected since the opinions were designed speciﬁcally
to yield the correct value for the ﬁrst moment.
For simple product and coproduct of opinions, the second moment of bðxSx^yÞ and
bðxSx_yÞ is equal to, or greater than the second moment of bðxxÞ  bðxyÞ and
bðxxÞ t bðxyÞ respectively. This means that for much of the domain, the variance for
bðxSx^yÞ and bðxSx_yÞ exceeds the variance of bðxxÞ  bðxyÞ and bðxxÞ t bðxyÞ
respectively.
For normal product and coproduct of opinions, the second moment of bðxNx^yÞ
and bðxNx_yÞ varies between being less than, being equal to, or being greater than the
second moment of bðxxÞ  bðxyÞ and bðxxÞ t bðxyÞ respectively, and consequently
the same relationships apply to the variance.
Based on the above analysis it seems that normal multiplication and comultipli-
cation of opinions corresponds more closely to the analytically correct multiplication
and comultiplication of b distributions, than do simple multiplication and comul-
tiplication of opinions. Although not perfect, normal multiplication and comulti-
plication are thus able to produce a good approximation of the analytically correct
products and coproducts.
It is important to know how good this approximation is. This can be done by
investigating the diﬀerence between the variance of bðxNx^yÞ and the variance of
bðxxÞ  bðxyÞ (the case of the coproduct follows immediately from the duality, i.e.
from de Morgan’s Laws). Equivalently, the diﬀerence between the second moments
can be studied since it is equal to the diﬀerence between the variances (as a conse-
quence of the fact that the ﬁrst moments are equal). The problem is diﬃcult ana-
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lytically, so a graphical approach has been adopted. Since the comparison is between
the product of the b distributions corresponding to two opinions, and the b distri-
bution of the normal product of the same opinions, and since each opinion has three
degrees of freedom, then the problem has six degrees of freedom, which is four more
than we are capable of visualising graphically (we need the third dimension for the
dependent variable, i.e. the diﬀerence between the variances). This means for a
graphical investigation into the behaviour, four independent conditions must be
imposed on the opinions. In Fig. 12, for example, we have set bx ¼ dx, by ¼ dy ,
ux ¼ uy and ax ¼ ay . The independent variables are the common value of the relative
atomicity ax ¼ ay and the common value of the uncertainty ux ¼ uy . The dependent
variable is V1  V2, where V1 is the variance of bðxNx^yÞ, and V2 is the variance of
bðxxÞ  bðxyÞ.
When the common value of the relative atomicity is 0, the diﬀerence is positive for
all values of the uncertainty strictly between 0 and 1, so that the variance of bðxNx^yÞ
exceeds the variance of bðxxÞ  bðxyÞ. When the common value of the atomicity is 1,
the diﬀerence is negative for all values of the uncertainty strictly between 0 and 1, so
that the variance of bðxxÞ  bðxyÞ exceeds the variance of bðxNx^yÞ. When the common
value of the uncertainty is 0 (i.e. for dogmatic opinions), the diﬀerence is zero, so that
the variance of bðxNx^yÞ and the variance of bðxxÞ  bðxyÞ are equal. When the
common value of the uncertainty is 1, the diﬀerence is positive for all values of
the relative atomicity strictly between 0 and 1, so that the variance of bðxNx^yÞ exceeds
the variance of bðxxÞ  bðxyÞ. The diﬀerence between the variances takes its largest
magnitude when the common value for the relative atomicity is 1
2
and the common
value of the uncertainty is 1, and for those speciﬁc values, the variance of bðxNx^yÞ
exceeds the variance of bðxxÞ  bðxyÞ by 172. It is conjectured that the greatest dif-
ference between the variance of the bðxNx^yÞ and the variance of bðxxÞ  bðxyÞ occurs
0
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Fig. 12. Variance for bðxNx^yÞ minus variance for bðxxÞ  bðxyÞ.
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when the uncertainties of both opinions are 1 and the relative atomicities have a
common value of 1
2
, and this greatest diﬀerence is 1
72
. This is precisely the diﬀerence
which is illustrated in Fig. 9. Because the conjectured diﬀerence is so small, then the
normal product and normal coproduct can be considered to be very good approx-
imations to the product and coproduct, respectively, of the b distributions of the
individual opinions.
11. Correspondence to other logic frameworks
The subjective logic operators described above represent generalisations of clas-
sical probability and logic operators in the context of belief theory. In the case of
dogmatic opinions, i.e. when ux ¼ 0, opinions are equivalent to probabilities through
the correspondence PðxÞ ¼ bx. Opinions thus represent a generalisation of probabil-
ities. Furthermore, probabilities represent a generalisation of truth values in binary
logic, where TRUE is equivalent to the special case P ðxÞ ¼ 1 and FALSE is equivalent
to the special case P ðxÞ ¼ 0. In subjective logic these cases are expressed by the
opinions ð1; 0; 0; axÞ for TRUE, and by ð0; 1; 0; axÞ for FALSE, where 0 < ax < 1.
Multiplication, comultiplication, division and codivision of dogmatic opinions are
equivalent to the corresponding probability operators in Table 1.
The correspondence between binary logic operators and probability/opinion
operators is given in Table 2. Some of the operators are not widely used, and new
names and symbols had to be deﬁned.
It can be shown that the multiplication and comultiplication operators produce
the classical truth tables of AND and OR for the special cases where P ðxÞ ¼ 1 or
P ðxÞ ¼ 0. Similarly the truth tables of UN-AND and UN-OR can be determined
through the division and codivision operators. Table 3, which e.g. can be derived
from the expressions in Table 1, deﬁnes the complete truth table.
It can be shown that simple multiplication and comultiplication represent a
generalisation of the ^ and _ operators in [4] three valued logic, where opinions with
Table 1
Probability operators resulting from opinion operators
Multiplication P ðxÞPðyÞ
Division P ðxÞ=PðyÞ
Comultiplication P ðxÞ þ P ðyÞ  P ðxÞPðyÞ
Codivision ðP ðxÞ  P ðyÞÞ=ð1 P ðyÞÞ
Table 2
Correspondence between probability, set and logic operators
Opinion operator Symbol Set operator Logic operator Symbol
Multiplication Æ Conjunction AND ^
Division / Unconjunction UN-AND ^
Comultiplication t Disjunction OR _
Codivision t Undisjunction UN-OR _
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u ¼ 1 can be interpreted as undeﬁned or undetermined in Kleene’s terminology. In
weak Kleene logic, x ^ y is undeﬁned if for example x is undeﬁned and y is FALSE,
because not all arguments have deﬁned values. In strong Kleene logic, x ^ y is
FALSE if x is undeﬁned and y is FALSE, because as long as one argument is FALSE
the value of the other argument is irrelevant. Similarly for OR when one of the
arguments has value TRUE. When applied to opinions where either b ¼ 1, d ¼ 1 or
u ¼ 1, simple multiplication and comultiplication produce the truth tables of
Kleene’s strong ^ and _ operators.
It can also be mentioned that simple multiplication and comultiplication are
equivalent to the ‘‘AND’’ and ‘‘OR’’ operators of Baldwin’s support logic [1] except
for the relative atomicity parameter which is absent in Baldwin’s logic. In Baldwin’s
logic, each proposition has a support pair ½Sl; Su where Sl represents the lower or
necessary support, and Su represents the upper or possible support. This is in fact the
same as the [Belief, Plausibility] pair of classical belief theory, but instead of focusing
on frames of discernment, Baldwin’s theory focuses on individual propositions. A
support pair ½0; 1 is equivalent to a vacuous BMA, and would correspond to the
undeﬁned truth value in Kleene’s logic. The support pairs ½0; 0 and ½1; 1 correspond
to false and true propositions respectively.
Having established the correspondence to Kleene’s three valued logic, and to
Baldwin’s support logic, it can be useful to illustrate what subjective logic can do in
addition. Let for example S be a set of independent propositions with undeﬁned
truth value in Kleene’s terminology, or with support pairs ½0; 1 in Baldwin’s ter-
minology. The conjunction of all the statements s 2 S would always produce a
proposition with undeﬁned truth value in Kleene’s theory, and a support pair ½0; 1 in
Baldwin’s theory. However, the intuitive interpretation of the conjunction of
undeﬁned/uncertain propositions is that the likelihood of the conjunctive proposi-
tion being true decreases as a function of jSj. Similarly, the likelihood of a disjunctive
proposition of S being true increases as a function of jSj. This intuitive observation
can not be derived by Kleene’s or Baldwin’s frameworks, but is explicitly reﬂected in
subjective logic through the relative atomicity and the probability expectation value.
12. Conclusion
The two coarsening methods described in Section 2 describe two diﬀerent sur-
jective mappings from a generalised frame of discernment and BMA to the opinion
Table 3
Truth tables for AND, OR, UN-AND and UN-OR
x y AND
x ^ y
OR
x _ y
UN-AND
x ^y
UN-OR
x_y
F F F F T or F F
F T F T F undeﬁned
T F F T undeﬁned T
T T T T T T or F
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space. Eq. (40) deﬁnes a bijective mapping between opinions and the sub-class of b
probability distribution functions bða; bÞ where aþ bP 2.
The coarsening process together with the bijective correspondence between
opinions and b distributions provides a speciﬁc interpretation of belief functions in
terms of Bayesian probabilities. Two opinions that correspond to b distributions can
be multiplied or comultiplied to produce a new product or coproduct opinion that
also corresponds to a b distribution. Under this interpretation our analysis of
multiplication and comultiplication of opinions has led us to the conclusion that
these operators only provide an approximation of the analytical multiplication and
comultiplication of b distributions.
In general the product of two b distributions is not a b distribution, and the
analytical expressions for products and coproducts of probability distributions
quickly become exceedingly complex, whereas the expressions for products and
coproducts of opinions are very simple. The advantage of doing calculations with
opinions rather that with probability distributions, is a dramatic reduction in
complexity.
Since it appears that the variance of the b distribution for the normal product of
opinions diﬀers from the variance of the product of the b distributions for the
individual opinions by no more than about 0.014 (and a similar result holds for the
coproduct by de Morgan’s Laws), then the approximation of the product of the b
distributions by the normal product of the opinions is very good.
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 7.1. Because of the symmetry between the random variables, and
because of iteration, it suﬃces to prove that
ðP1; . . . ; Pk2; Pk1 þ PkÞ  Dirichletða1; . . . ; ak2; ak1 þ akÞ:
This can be proven by evaluating the marginal probability density function
f ðP1 ¼ p1; . . . ; Pk2 ¼ pk2Þ ¼
Z 1Pk2
i¼1 pi
0
f ðp1; . . . ; pk1Þdpk1
¼
C
Pk
i¼1 ai
 
Qk
i¼1 CðaiÞ
Yk2
i¼1
pai1i
Z 1Pk2
i¼1 pi
0
pak11k1 p
ak1
k dpk1;
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where pk ¼ 1
Pk1
i¼1 pi. Changing the variable of integration to
q ¼ pk1
1Pk2i¼1 pi ;
then the integral becomes
f ðP1 ¼ p1; . . . ; Pk2 ¼ pk2Þ
¼
C
Pk
i¼1 ai
 
Qk
i¼1 CðaiÞ
Yk2
i¼1
pai1i
Z 1Pk2
i¼1 pi
0
pak11k1 p
ak1
k dpk1
¼
C
Pk
i¼1 ai
 
Qk
i¼1 CðaiÞ
Yk2
i¼1
pai1i 1
 

Xk2
i¼1
pi
!ak1þak1 Z 1
0
qak11ð1 qÞak1 dq
¼
C
Pk
i¼1 ai
 
Qk2
i¼1 CðaiÞ
 
Cðak1 þ akÞ
Yk2
i¼1
pai1i
 !
1
 

Xk2
i¼1
pi
!ak1þak1
;
thus demonstrating that ðP1; . . . ; Pk2; Pk1 þ PkÞ  Dirichletða1; . . . ; ak2; ak1 þ akÞ,
and completing the proof. h
Proof of Theorem 8.1. Since Q and R are independent uniformly distributed random
variables and P ¼ QR, then for all p 2 ð0; 1Þ,
P ðp < P < 1Þ ¼ vðp < QR < 1Þ ¼
Z 1
p
dqP
p
q

< R < 1

¼
Z 1
p
dq
Z 1
p
q
dr
¼
Z 1
p
dq 1

 p
q

¼ q½  p ln q1p ¼ 1 p þ p ln p:
Since f ðpÞ ¼ dP ðp < P < 1Þ=dp, then f ðpÞ ¼  ln p for 0 < p < 1. h
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